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has been made towards the realisation of current goals, which are framed largely in terms of the concept of 'equal opportunities'. The authors argue that while the concept of diversity appears to provide a more sociologically well founded basis for future government strategy on this aspect of service personnel policy, there remain significant obstacles to effective implementation of practical measures. These concern in particular the way in which the armed services relate to wider questions of British identity. Successfully increasing the participation of minority ethnic communities in the British armed services, we contend, entails developing a new framework for British identity and citizenship that cannot be accomplished by the armed services alone. Rather it is a responsibility of both government and wider society as a whole.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, human resource or 'people' issues have moved up the agenda of the British armed services. Of course, a focus on people has always been important, as armed forces can only be as effective as the personnel who work for them; yet, until recently, strategic and technological issues have tended to occupy centre stage. 1 A key people issue in the UK is the increasing expectation -not least by government -that the armed services should 'reflect' society.
One meaning of this phrase is that the social profile of the Services should correspond more closely with that of the wider population in terms of gender, sexual orientation, social class and ethnicity.
This paper considers the pressures on the British armed services to increase the participation of minority ethnic groups and reviews recent government policy in this area. To date, its response has been framed largely in terms of the logic of 'equal opportunities' with, we note, only limited progress being made towards the realisation of current goals. We argue that this lack of progress may not be accidental and suggest that there may be good reasons for believing that current policy targets may be unreachable. Against this background, we note that the concept of diversity is increasingly being invoked in policy discourses addressed to the representation of minority ethnic groups in the armed services. 2 As will become clear, we argue that, in principle, this concept could provide a more sociologically well founded basis for future government thinking and practice. However, we suggest that a number of major issues would need to be addressed if a strategy based on this concept were to be implemented effectively. Some of these issues relate to the organisation and history of the British armed services. Others, however, have to do with the nature of British identity more generally. We argue that the British armed services -a relatively small, all-volunteer force -cannot realistically be expected successfully to address the problem of increasing the participation of minority ethnic communities within their ranks without the prior development of a robust framework of ideas about how these broader identity issues are to be 1 P o s t -P r i n t tackled. 3 Such a framework is first and foremost a responsibility of government and the wider society as a whole.
This paper sets out the basis on which such a framework might be constructed. We should make it clear that the primary purpose of this paper is to explore some key conceptual issues concerning representation, equity, nationality and citizenship as they bear on the British context. Whilst we are interested in the implications that our conceptual explorations have for policy, the aim of this paper is not to design detailed practical policy measures for the British armed forces. Indeed, a key aspect of our discussion is our claim that both the armed services and British society more In Britain, the problem is simultaneously to secure equity of representation and of treatment.
Minority ethnic communities and the armed services: a story of under-representation.
It is important at the outset to be clear about what is meant when British policy makers refer to 'minority ethnic groups'. In Britain, ethnic difference is almost exclusively associated with an implicit division of the population into an ethnic 'majority' and a number of ethnic 'minorities'.
This perspective is a product of the pattern of migration to Britain since the Second World War, resulting in the growth of a population whose recent origins lie in the former British colonies in the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Africa, and East Asia. These populations are commonly 2 P o s t -P r i n t referred to in popular culture and in public policy as 'ethnic minorities'. Two points about this terminology are significant. The first is that in order to qualify for designation as an ethnic minority, a category of people must exhibit a degree of 'difference' that is regarded as significant.
Not every group having a distinctive culture and constituting a minority in the British population is normally included. For example, the large communities of people of Cypriot, Italian and Polish origin (to name but a few) to be found in many British cities are rarely so labelled. Similarly, to refer to an earlier example, people of Irish descent, a significant proportion of the British population, are rarely defined in this way. 5 In practice, it is a combination of visibility by skin colour and cultural values that marks off 'ethnic minorities' from the 'majority' population in
Britain. This latter point has been highlighted both by domestic strife in British cities involving minority ethnic communities and, more recently by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, discussions of which have become entwined with existing debates on immigration and asylum seekers. After September 11, in particular, it is now possible to debate the nature of 'Britishness' and how to integrate minority cultural communities -not least those with Islamic roots -into the mainstream of British society in ways that were difficult if not impossible before.
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The second point about the term 'ethnic minorities' is that, despite the implicit emphasis on difference, such groups are typically seen to have more in common with one another than with the 'majority'. Diversity among the groups so designated is thus downplayed while their purported differences from the rest of the population are exaggerated. This is not necessarily a conscious process; nor is it driven simply by those committed to explicitly racist, or otherwise exclusionary, political projects -such as far right political parties. Even initiatives driven by a commitment to policies designed to address ethnic disadvantage and exclusion find it difficult to escape these assumptions. Thus, for example, the question in the 1991 Census of Population designed to measure the ethnic diversity of the British population, and map differences of experience and opportunity, effectively reinforced the distinction between an undifferentiated 'white' population and a limited number of 'ethnic minorities'.
The former rests on considerations of equity: that the participation of all members of society in its core public institutions is a moral and political priority because it symbolises what a decent, tolerant and inclusive society should be. By contrast, the business case relies on more hardnosed, material calculations. It claims that widening the recruitment pool to include more members of the minority ethnic communities would both increase the numbers of potential recruits and broaden the values and insights within the military, in turn adding to its intellectual capital. 10 Furthermore, whether recruiting from the majority pool or from minority communities, there is also an assumption that the armed services will provide recruits with an opportunity for bettering themselves later on in life when their military careers have ended. 11 The most recent data show a persistent gap between the social profile of the armed services and that of wider society, although there have been some recent modest increases in the participation of minority ethnic groups, not least in the British Army. In October 2001 (the date at which the most recent systematic data are available), when the overall percentage of minority ethnic groups in the wider population was said to be approximately 6 per cent 12 , the percentage of Regular personnel in the UK armed services drawn from minority ethnic groups was 1.7 per cent overall (1.2 per cent for Officers and 1.8 per cent for Other Ranks). This compares with the 1.00 per cent overall (1 per cent officers and 1 per cent Other Ranks) for April 1998. 13 Within these already low levels of participation in the armed services, South Asian minority ethnic groups (a significant proportion of the UK minority ethnic population) are particularly under-represented among uniformed personnel.
There are some interesting variations by individual service: the Royal Navy has increased minority ethnic representation from 0.7 per cent to 1 per cent overall (0.9 per cent to 1. We are determined that the Armed Forces should better reflect the ethnic composition of the British population. Currently some 6% of the general population are from ethnic minority backgrounds, but they make up just 1% of the Services. This must not continue.
We have set a goal of attracting 2% of new recruits this year from ethnic minority communities for each Service. We want that goal to increase by 1% each year so that, eventually, the composition of our Armed Forces reflects that of the population as a whole.
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Here the emphasis is clearly on proportionality of representation and the implication is clear: its absence is itself evidence of continuing disadvantage or unfairness. How do we account for this divergence in policy assumptions? To understand the issues involved we must examine the discourse of equal opportunities as it has developed in the UK.
Thinking through equal opportunities in the UK: two dilemmas
In debates about equal opportunities in Britain, two recurrent dilemmas are especially relevant to the contemporary armed services. 21 The first is the question of whether the objective of policy should be to secure equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. In practice, however, liberal proceduralist policies have frequently been judged in terms of standards that are, in principle, the province of an outcomes-centred approach -what has been termed the 'radical model'. 24 In its extreme form, such a perspective would envisage positive discrimination in favour of under-represented groups, a practice that remains unlawful in Britain.
However, a good deal of orthodox equal opportunities discourse involves making comparisons between groups in terms of the notion of proportionality of representation. Hence the stress on monitoring, measurement and intervention in terms of positive action even if, as research evidence suggests, these have by no means been widespread even among organisations apparently committed to equal opportunities. 25 We are faced then with a paradox: the liberal model's emphasis on opportunity is frequently combined with a concern with outcomes while, in practice, the measures necessary to deliver greater equity in outcomes are not systematically pursued. Critically, these features highlight the weaknesses of approaches to equal opportunities that concentrate on technical or administrative solutions and they signal the ultimately political character of equal opportunities as an issue for excluded and marginalized groups.
Despite the dominance of generic approaches to policy, however, it is by no means the case that, in It is important to ask, given this contrast, whether the goal of statistical representation of minority ethnic groups is achievable even if resources continue to be allocated to the achievement of targets to close the gap between the armed services and society on this issue. 32 In our view, there is a real danger that the commitment to 'representativeness' (as expressed in SDR) is a promise that cannot be delivered.
A key difficulty with which the armed services have to contend is that the gross category 'ethnic minority' takes no account of the different socio-demographic profiles, levels of social mobility, educational attainment and cultural traditions of the very diverse groups that make up Britain's 9 P o s t -P r i n t minority ethnic population. It is quite conceivable that the overall target of increasing minority ethnic participation to a level commensurate with the proportion of the population classified as 'ethnic minority' could be reached without proportionality being achieved for some of the communities involved. Were this to be the case, the credibility of the armed services' commitment to equal opportunities might be challenged, particularly if the consequent over-representation of some groups was reflected in differential casualty rates.
Of critical importance is the probability that members of different groups may have differential propensities to select particular occupations or to aspire to particular careers. Given that we know that the 'white' population has not had a uniform propensity to select the armed forces as a career, we should not be surprised if similar differentials were to be found among other groups; although it must be said that what we know about the attitudes and aspirations of different minority ethnic communities concerning the armed services as a career continues to rest more on military recruiters' practical judgements and anecdote rather than systematic research. 33 Moreover, in order to know that completely proportional representation was unattainable -perhaps even undesiredby the groups concerned, the armed services would have to be confident that potential recruits were exercising genuinely unconstrained choices. This would mean ensuring that they had a demonstrably effective programme for promoting opportunities and eliminating discriminatory decision-making and other practices.
Nevertheless, until recently, it has been commonplace to assume that the labour market experience of members of minority ethnic groups has been universally one of disadvantage and exclusion.
Without in any way minimising the weight of evidence that points in this direction it is important to note the complexity in the ways in which the rapid economic change of the 1980s and early 1990s has affected existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage in the labour market. An increasing number of studies in the early 1990s had already begun to suggest that members of some groups were experiencing significant upward occupational mobility. 34 The growth of a middle class of professional and managerial workers in some minority ethnic communities, and the 10 P o s t -P r i n t entry of these groups into the service sector, has led some to suggest that there is a developing convergence in the class structures of minority ethnic groups towards that of the majority white population. 35 These trends have been confirmed by the most recent analyses of data for the late 1990s, which suggest that, in terms of economic activity, unemployment and job levels, even some of the previously most disadvantaged groups, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, have continued to close the gap with whites. 36 We should note that the patterns are complex, particularly in relation to differences between men
and women, and we should avoid jumping to too many conclusions about future patterns of minority ethnic disadvantage. There remain significant differences between members of different ethnic groups, with those of Caribbean descent in particular apparently still lagging behind.
Moreover, there are marked regional variations with significant local pockets of labour market disadvantage and exclusion affecting even those groups apparently experiencing upward mobility.
We should also remember that upward mobility is quite compatible with occupational segregation, and with continuing discrimination. Moreover, there may there be important differences of level within broad occupational categories, such as those between senior and middle management.
What this evidence does point to, however, is a need to place any discussion of the attractiveness to potential minority ethnic recruits of a career in the armed services in the context of a recognition that the range of other opportunities open to them is also changing. The evidence about educational attainment further reinforces this point. It is clear that members of minority ethnic groups are more likely to remain in full-time education after the age of 16 than are their white counterparts-a finding which holds both for young men and young women. 37 Moreover, the evidence suggests that this is a pattern of relatively longstanding, dating back at least to the beginning of the 1980s. 38 In addition, it appears that, in general, minority ethnic groups are overrepresented in higher education relative to their presence in the population as a whole, although this gross observation conceals some important variations. 'equal opportunities' discourse in many civilian equal opportunities circles in the UK. 45 Moreover, as we noted at the outset, it is also a term increasingly invoked in policy discussions concerning the representativeness of the armed services, even if it is not always clear that those deploying it have fully grasped its nuances.
Is it possible that embracing the concept of diversity could provide a way out of the policy dilemmas we have identified? Might it provide a way of legitimising the pursuit of delegative representation, and hence of recognising and exploiting ethnic and other differences in occupational aspirations rather than dismissing them as simply an artefact of ignorance or exclusion?
The armed services and representing society: a strategy based on diversity
According to its proponents, the concept of diversity means that people are valued precisely because of their differences. 46 It assumes that different people will bring a variety of perspectives to an organization and that, through the contribution of these diverse viewpoints, the most innovative and effective solutions will be generated. Since it is also committed to using fully the talents of individuals, allowing them to rise to the limit of their abilities, the diversity model is said simultaneously to address individual needs while enhancing the capacity of organisations to mobilise human resources and respond to unpredictable environments.
These claims resonate directly with both the citizenship and business cases for improving the equal opportunities performance of the armed services. On the one hand, tapping the pool of labour represented by minority ethnic communities is justified on the ground that the armed services would benefit from the diversity of skills and backgrounds that a broader based entry would produce. With the need for more intelligent and flexible service personnel likely to increase rather than decrease due to developments such as new technologies and more complex, politically 13 P o s t -P r i n t sensitive, missions it is held that such diversity is likely to prove an advantage in future years. 47 At the same time valuing diversity will provide the opportunities to realise the SDR's commitment to developing a personnel strategy that could:
enable individuals to realise their full potential during their service, provide equality of opportunity irrespective of race, gender or religion, and assist them to prepare for subsequent careers… 48 For the British armed services, the utility of the concept of diversity, then, would appear to lie in its potential to transcend the difficulties associated with the idea of proportionality and to legitimise a delegative sense of representativeness. Yet it is by no means clear that diversity is a straightforward concept for military organisations in general, and the UK armed forces in particular, to embrace. Discipline, authority and conformity are central to the social integration of military units and organisations. They are key aspects of the notions of comradeship and esprit de corps that are core components of military self-image and organisation. These characteristics of military organisations tend, in principle, to give rise to problems when confronted with difference -a fact that may help to explain some of the difficulties they have encountered with the integration of female, gay and related 'others'. 49 Traditionally, the UK armed services have been able to incorporate certain kinds of ethnic and national differences into a broader, British and imperial identity. An example is the role played by the sub-state national communities of Wales, Ireland and, especially, Scotland in the development of the military and its role in the construction, policing and dismantling of empire. 50 It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of empire on the culture of the armed services, especially the Army and Royal Navy. In the case of the British Army, it is symbolised by the continued recruitment of In contrast with the position of the longer established national communities at the core of British history, and that of the Gurkhas, the situation has been rather different for many of Britain's contemporary minority ethnic populations. This is due not least to their position as visible minorities, marking them out as different from their white peers -whether for reasons of biology, culture or history -in the context of the distinctive polarities of British conceptions of ethnicity discussed above.
This perspective on ethnic difference poses particular problems for the relationship between citizenship and nationality in a British context, and in turn affects the ways in which the armed services can operate. This is because of the way in which both 'Englishness' and 'Britishness' have been represented as uniquely long-standing and primordial attachments. 53 The significance of this appeal to historical continuity is greatly heightened when we consider the fact that all armed services tend to place a high value on tradition and history. In the case of the British armed services, this emphasis on history has a particular significance since much of the military history of the Britain over the last two centuries or so is the history of colonial involvement. Many of the campaigns fought by the British armed services were either against colonised peoples or to protect imperial territory from other colonial powers. Thus the recent forebears of many of Britain's citizens who are not white were either enemies or colonial subjects. In these circumstances, it may be difficult to view their descendants as co-nationals -whatever their formal citizenship -because they lack both the common origins and the ethnic homogeneity which the British national myth, with its claims to a uniquely long history, requires. We do not know enough about how minority ethnic communities view the armed services or the extent to which they consider the military as a prospective career. 54 The burden of history and tradition that we described above creates a situation in which the armed services are seen, and to some extent see themselves, as symbolically representative of a political community that is being superseded by a much more ethnically diverse Britain. One way of addressing this might be to seek explicitly to recover the historical contribution of the forebears of As we saw above, the evidence on occupational and social mobility suggests that conventional categories underplay ethnic diversity both in terms of range and the patterning of change in experience. They also fail to capture in any precise way, the subtleties of individual and collective identities: these are more dynamic and complex than conventional British conceptions of ethnic difference allow, and there is evidence that significant processes are afoot which are increasingly challenging many taken for granted assumptions about ethnic, and for that matter national, identities. Nor are these processes confined to the identities of Britain's minority ethnic citizens.
Commentators have noted how the process of political devolution within the United Kingdom is leading to a reinvigoration of longstanding national identities among both the Scots and the Welsh.
Hand in hand with devolution is a growing regional agenda, at both national and EU levels, which has the potential to reawaken regional identities, which have long appeared dormant. An interesting by-product of these developments has been the way in which Englishness as an identity has been increasingly posed as a question for public debate. 59 As the dominant national group in we lack an historical perspective. Linda Colley has argued that the British nation was invented in the wake of the 1707 Act of Union. It was forged as a national identity in and through a series of conflicts, notably with France, over a period of about a century and a half. So successful was this process that, until brought into question by recent developments, the existence of a British national identity was rarely, if ever, challenged. Yet it was quintessentially a political project in which a new set of essentially ethnic boundaries was consciously erected and celebrated.
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The instrumental character of this process draws our attention to the fact that current attempts to rediscover some primordial essence of an English identity are fundamentally misplaced. As Colin Kidd has shown, in the 17 th Century there were at least eight versions of the English story -all of them related to different political projects ranging from Royalism to Leveller radicalism. 62 A common problem for all of them was how to weave the diverse histories of the various groups out of which England had emerged, into a coherent national story. It was not an easy task. As late as 1867, The Times noted:
...there is hardly such a thing as a pure Englishman in this island. In place of the rather vulgarised and very inaccurate phrase, Anglo-Saxon, our national denomination, to be strictly correct, would be a composite of a dozen national titles...
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If the question of what constitutes a British or English identity is not new, it is no less real for those who find it necessary to confront them at the beginning of the 21 st century. Given the confluence of the above two sets of debates about nationality and ethnic difference, the consequent general questioning about British identity opens the way for a more nuanced understanding of 18 P o s t -P r i n t ethnic diversity. However, it may also lead to defensiveness about identities thought to be under threat. In this connection, some have argued that, until recently, it has been difficult to celebrate English identity in the educational curriculum because the ideology of some versions of multiculturalism has, in its attempts to celebrate non-English cultures and remove any sense of the superiority of one culture over another, sometimes regarded any attempts to praise the 'host culture' as racist or exclusionary. 64 Such a nuanced appreciation of ethnic diversity would need to be based on an overarching narrative for British national identity, debates over which are becoming more significant. This narrative would recognise the distinctive contributions of the different ethnic communities that comprise modern Britain while at the same time highlighting a set of values to which all of its citizens need to subscribe. 65 Such civic values are rooted in the history of the country -a history that while having a dimension of imperialism, domination, exclusion and exploitation also has one 
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CONCLUSION
The British armed services have a well-established pattern of under-representation of minority ethnic citizens, which current government policy is seeking to reverse. One of the difficulties with this policy is that it is underpinned by a concept of representativeness that has not been fully thought through. As a result, it is quite possible that even with the commitment of further resources to the setting and achieving of recruitment targets for minority ethnic citizens, the goal of closing the gap between this aspect of the social profile of the armed services and wider British society will not be achieved. We have suggested that, instead of relying on a concept of statistical or proportional representation, the armed services would be better served by an approach based on delegative representation. This, in turn, might be harnessed to the current enthusiasm in Britain for invoking the discourse of diversity when issues of equity and representation are at stake. This approach would, in principle, be able to take advantage of recent developments in the nature of national and ethnic differences within the United Kingdom and begin to address the citizenship case for greater equity, albeit in a more sophisticated way than is characteristically enshrined in Critically, however, we also claim that this aspect of military personnel policy cannot be developed successfully in isolation from a broader political project that is focused on the question of British national identity. It will not be easy to develop a narrative for British national identity for the twenty-first century, which we argue is a necessary basis for policy on the participation of minority ethnic communities in the British armed services. One difficulty is that this narrative could become merely a restatement of a traditional assimilationist or integrationist agenda, one that does not do justice to the complexity of minority ethnic identities or indeed of the identities of the more long-standing communities within the UK. Such a traditional agenda would be ill attuned to the real ethnic diversity of modern Britain, and constantly be wrong footed by its dynamism as the 21 st Century unfolds. There are also some serious issues of timing and responsibility. It is one thing to ask the armed services to construct a post-imperial identity, which all members of modern Britain could aspire to join. It is quite another to ask them to develop this in isolation from and before government and society as a whole takes the lead in developing the broader framework in which this military project can be developed. This is, emphatically, not an argument for inaction on the part of the armed services. Nothing in this paper should give comfort to those who, for whatever reason, would prefer that the armed services be allowed to duck responsibility for their own recruitment and employment policies and practices. Continued progress, however limited, in increasing the numbers of minority ethnic recruits, at all levels and in all arms, is arguably essential to sustaining the armed forces' legitimacy claims in relation to civil society as a whole. Our discussion is, however, intended to highlight the fact that practical problems in delivering fully on current commitments are in part a product of real conceptual dilemmas surrounding notions of representation, identity and diversity.
21
These are issues that bear not only on the armed services but also on British society as a whole. It is ultimately at the national level that they will have to be resolved.
22
P o s t -P r i n t P o s t -P r i n t resolution of those problems, however, we argue that it is difficult to see how they can realistically deliver current government commitments. This is not, however, an argument for inertia and inaction. There is clear scope for further effort in pursuit of current goals. The armed services still have some way to go in convincing the public that they have effectively addressed past exclusionary policies and practices. It is also arguable that there is plenty of scope for increasing the numerical representation of minority ethnic groups such that it approached, more closely than hitherto, current numerical targets. 4 If there is a parallel in Britain to this US experience, it is in the conditional inclusion and differential treatment of Britain's imperial subjects in the colonial armed forces. However, as we argue below, this heritage has specific, and rather different, implications for the British case. 11 We do not know enough about the extent to which serving in the armed services provides opportunities for later civilian life and employment. Of the 18,000 who left the armed services in 2001, the 13, 000 who had served 5 or more years were covered by the official Resettlement Package. Of the remaining 5,000 those who have served for 3 to 5 years were eligible for job seeking assistance, while those with less than three years service received no special assistance. Overall 85% of all leavers get work within six months, but the breakdown by category of leaver is not known. This issue is connected with a broader concern for the health and welfare of ex-service personnel on the part of the UK government, which has led to the formation of a new Veterans' Agency and a junior MOD minister who has specific responsibility for this area of service These citizenship rules determine who can join the armed services. There is a difference regarding those who can join the enlisted ranks and those who apply to become officers of British Army. Current rules exclude from the officers' corps those who are not born in the UK or its territories (or who have not been resident in the UK for at least five years), whereas for the enlisted ranks the rules state that if 'applicants reside outside the United Kingdom, they will only be eligible to enlist if they are exempt from immigration control: that is to say they have been given indefinite leave to reside and work in the United Kingdom under Immigration rules' (from www.army.mod.uk/careers/enquiry/sol/_entry_require.htm). As with the rules for citizenship, reviewed above, the material point is the connection with the United Kingdom. The armed services (especially the Army) actively recruit from the Commonwealth, for example from Fiji. South Africa, Kenya, the Caribbean, Australia and New Zealand. It is possible that, given the current shortages in the armed services (approximately 8,500 overall with most in the Army), there will be even great efforts to recruit from overseas. 
